RFC: PhIP-06: Defining the Phonon DAO Governance and Operational Structure

Gathering Consensus
1

(28 MARCH 2022) Please see the updated proposal here.

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Summary

The mandate for the Phonon DAO Bootstrapping Group expires on April 10, 2022. The DAO needs a governance structure to facilitate decision making, prioritize DAO efforts, and manage operations after this date. This proposal recommends and outlines the creation of a Phonon DAO Council that would allow the DAO to execute its mission. Following a consensus gathering poll (vote below), this proposal would be voted on via Snapshot. At this time, we are also seeking your feedback on position titles.

Motivation

A few of the key challenges facing DAOs are a lack of operational and strategic focus, as well as community visibility into DAO operations as they become more robust and impactful.

The organizational structure suggested below solves for these challenges by:

  • Creating three classes of DAO operatives: Community Directors*, DAO Directors* and Working Group Leads
  • Recommending that a DAO Council be developed, which will consist of Community Directors*, DAO Directors* and Working Group Leads. The Council would meet monthly to provide the community (via Community Directors* and observers) with an understanding of how the DAO is progressing on its community-approved strategic plan.
  • From a high-level responsibility perspective:
    • Community Directors* provide oversight and input on the proposed DAO strategic plan and budget.
    • DAO Directors* are responsible for developing the overall DAO strategic plan proposal, key objectives, presenting the plan to the community for approval and ensuring the community-approved plan is executed (with the support of Working Group Leads).
    • Working Group Leads have operational responsibility for implementing projects outlined in the community-approved strategic plan, requesting, managing and dispersing budgets, developing sub-Working Groups (as necessary), etc.
  • This structure will:
    • Ensure that the DAO is focusing on achieving key community-mandated strategic objectives on an annual and semi-annual basis.
    • Ensure Working Group activities are aligned around key community-approved strategic objectives and projects that are being implemented are on-strategy and accountable to the community.
    • Provide for continuity of personnel so that knowledge and experience is not lost as Working Group Leads cycle in and out of their positions.
    • Guarantee community accountability and visibility.

Phonon DAO Governance Structure

The Phonon DAO will be governed by a DAO Council, which shall be comprised of members elected by the DAO at-large. The DAO Council will consist of three types of positions, whose organization structure and position descriptions are described in Figure 1 and Table 1.

Figure 1: Phonon DAO Council Organizational Structure

Phonon DAO Governance Process (1)
Phonon DAO Governance Process (1)800×600 21.4 KB

Table 1 - Phonon DAO Council Organizational Structure

Organizational Layer

DAO Entity Type (Number)

Duties/Focus 

Layer 1 (Top Layer) 

Community Directors* (3)
  • Elected community members responsible for providing oversight of DAO Leads’ activities, including budgets, deliverables, and progress. 
  • Serve on the DAO Council.
  • Community Directors also help set the overall priorities for the DAO (DAO roadmap, key action items). 
  • Attend DAO-wide Council Meetings once a month.
  • Community Directors serve a mandate of two terms.
  • Community engagement is a must for this position.
  • Expected time commitment: 2-4 hours/week per Director.

Compensation: Compensated position (stipend of $750/month in PHONON).   

Layer 2

DAO Directors* (2) 
  • Elected community members responsible for developing and proposing an overall quarterly strategic plan for the DAO, which will include objectives, key projects, implementation roadmaps and budgets.
  • Provide operational services to the DAO, including budget management, engaging with the foundation, and legal counsel.
  • Work with various entities wishing to engage with the DAO, including VCs, manufacturers, and others.
  • Review, manage, and guide funding requests from Working Groups.
  • Organize and co-lead Council Meetings.
  • Engage with Community Directors as needed to keep them informed of DAO progress.
  • Engage with Working Group Leads as needed to keep activities synched, overcome operational roadblocks, etc. 
  • DAO Directors serve a mandate of two terms. 
  • DAO Directors are responsible for maintaining operational and strategic consistency as Working Group Leads cycle in and out of projects/initiatives. 
  • Expected time commitment: 20-30 hours/week per Director.


Compensation: Total compensation will be determined by the DAO, based on compensation ranges submitted by nominees. Nominees are considered independent contractors and are responsible for covering their own insurance, taxes, etc.

Layer 3

DAO Working Group Leads (4) 
  • Elected members of the community responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of various DAO working groups. The current Working Groups are: Economics,  Product, Operations and Governance, and Communications.  One Working Group Lead will be elected per working group. 
  • Working Group Leads engage with DAO directors re: progress, blockers, budget requests, alignment with overall strategic imperatives and other details. 
  • Working Group Leads can hire or otherwise recruit Working Group Agents, as well as develop sub-Working Groups related to specific projects they are working on. Agents can be community members (working under a defined budget) or third-party contractors. 
  • Working Group Leads shall serve a mandate of one term, usually related to the implementation of specific projects/initiatives undertaken by the DAO.
  • Expected time commitment: 15-20 hours/week per Lead.

Compensation: Total compensation will be determined by the DAO, based on compensation ranges submitted by nominees. Nominees are considered independent contractors and are responsible for covering their own insurance, taxes, etc.

 

Mandates

Council members derive operational and strategic powers via community-provided Mandates, which extend over a predetermined term. A term is a six months, and there are two terms per year:

  1. Starting in 2023, Council terms officially begin on January 1 and run until the start of the second annual term (six months later).
    • Once this operational framework is approved by the DAO, there will be one term that starts upon first elections and ends on December 31, 2022.
  2. The second annual term starts on July 1 and runs until the start of the first term the following year.
  3. For the first two terms under this governance structure, the Product and Operations and Governance working groups will include an Agent who is a representative of GridPlus, to facilitate product development and operations

A DAO member may only hold one DAO Council position at a time. There is no limit to the amount of mandates a DAO member may serve, provided they are elected.

Budget and Strategic Plan Proposal Process

To request operational funds, the DAO Council will collaborate to submit a formal proposal (gov.phonon.network) for DAO vote via snapshot, which shall be held within the first 30 days of a term (each “Funding Window”).

  1. Before being voted on, the proposed budget must be submitted on the forum for discussion and feedback for at least 7 days.
  2. In the case of an emergency, where Working Group funds are needed by a Working Group outside of a Funding Window, a formal proposal may be submitted at any time by a Working Group Lead, with prior consultation and collaboration with one or more DAO and Community Directors to request additional funds from the DAO.

Compensation Adjustment Process

Approved compensation can be adjusted (up or down) via consultation with Community Directors and DAO Directors. All adjustments are subject to review by the DAO.

Ability to Relinquish Position

Any Council member may step down from their position after providing a 30-day notice. The rest of the Council shall decide to run a special election for the open position(s), or leave the position(s) open until regularly scheduled elections.

Removal of Council Member

Any DAO Council Member may be removed from duty via the following process:

  1. Performance review and recommendation by the DAO Council; a vote would take place to remove an individual; a majority vote is required to move the vote for removal to the community.
  2. Post the recommendation for removal to the forum for community discussion and review (RFC).
  3. After the recommendation is approved informally by the community, a two-thirds supermajority snapshot vote of the DAO, with a quorum of 10%+ of PHONON (from circulating supply).
  4. Upon removal of a DAO Council Member, the rest of the Council shall decide to run a special election for the open position(s), or leave the position open until regularly scheduled elections.

Dissolution of the DAO Council

The DAO Council may be dissolved via the following process:

  1. The community shall post the recommendation for dissolution to the forum for community discussion and review (RFC).
  2. After the recommendation is approved informally by the community, a two-thirds supermajority snapshot vote of the DAO, with a quorum of 10%+ of PHONON (from circulating supply).
  3. Upon dissolution of the DAO Council, the community shall organize new elections per this governance framework or provide a new process for governance.

Election Process

  1. Discourse posts will be created for DAO members to nominate themselves:
    • Community Director Nomination Thread
    • DAO Director Thread
    • Economics Working Group Lead Thread
    • Product Working Group Lead Thread
    • Operations and Governance Working Group Lead Thread
    • Communications Working Group Lead Thread
  2. After 7 days, the application period closes. If there are not enough candidates to fill the positions, applications will remain open until enough applications are received.
  3. New Discourse posts will be created for voting. Voting will last for 7 days. DAO members will be allowed to vote for 3 Community Director candidates, 2 DAO Director candidates, and 1 Working Group Lead candidate for each of the four working groups.
  4. The candidates with the most votes are submitted to the DAO for approval via a snapshot vote, voting lasts for 7 days and quorum is 10%+ of PHONON (from circulating supply).
  5. If the vote passes, the new DAO Council members are elected.
  6. If the vote fails, the DAO Council will accept any feedback and start the election process again. Anyone is free to reuse an existing application, and the existing DAO Council shall stay in place until the new Council members are elected.

Application

Applicants will need to answer these prompts to nominate themselves. These questions are subject to change by the DAO Council at any time.

Community Directors

  • Discord Handle
  • Summary Experience in DeFi/DAOs
  • Reason for applying
  • Describe your involvement thus far in the Phonon DAO
  • Qualifications - What will you bring to the DAO as a Community Director?
  • Confirmation that the applicant can commit the time required for the position; Other projects they are working on
  • Anything else you would like to share?

DAO Directors

  • Discord Handle
  • Summary Experience in DeFi/DAOs
  • Reason for applying
  • Involvement thus far in the Phonon DAO
  • Qualifications - What will you bring to the DAO as a DAO Director?
  • Minimum accepted compensation
  • Confirmation that the applicant can commit the time required for the position; Other projects they are working on; time they can commit to the position weekly
  • Other experience, perspectives and insights that would enable the individual to satisfactorily serve as DAO director

Working Group Leads

  • Discord Handle
  • Summary Experience in DeFi/DAOs
  • Desired Working Group Lead position (Product, Economics, Communications, etc.)
  • Reason for applying
  • Involvement thus far in the Phonon DAO
  • Minimum accepted compensation
  • Summaries of specific projects and initiatives they would like to lead/implement during their term: Provide project descriptions, resources required, time frame for completion and other details
  • Qualifications - What will you bring to the DAO as a Working Group Lead?
  • Other experience, perspectives and insights that would enable the individual to satisfactorily serve as Working Group Lead
  • Confirmation that the applicant can commit the time required for the position; Other projects they are working on; time they can commit to the position weekly

Next Steps

  • Approve this governance structure via Snapshot vote
  • Elect a new DAO Council

Layer 1 and Layer 2 Position Titles

The PDBG has not reached consensus on the use of the title “Director.” Argument for is that it is a professional title that is common to outsiders. Argument against is that it could imply legal responsibilities (à la Board of Directors). Possibilities include:

  • Community Director, DAO Director, Working Group Lead
  • Community Leader, DAO Leader, Working Group Lead
  • Community Head, DAO Manager, Working Group Lead
  • Something else you propose in the comments
  • I approve of the proposal, and I like “Director”
  • I approve of the proposal, and I like “Leader”
  • I approve of the proposal, and I like “Head” and “Manager”
  • I approve of the proposal, but I suggested new titles below
  • I approve of the proposal, and I do not care what the title is
  • I like the idea, but would like to tweak it before approving (provide feedback below)
  • I disapprove of this proposal

0 voters

This poll will stay open for 7 days.

2

Great proposal, structural clarity for the DAO is going to boost productivity.

I’m not completely sure for the reasoning to split community directors and DAO directors into separate roles? Seems to me that it would be better just to have DAO directors (as the DAO oversight), and put community responsibility into a working group.
Working groups:
Community
Communications (inc marketing)
Governance
Economics
product? (maybe), seems that lies with Grid, who can feedback to DAO. Communications will sort out the product messaging.

Working groups cover ALL operational responsibility. DAO directors are for oversight and making proposals for the entire DAO (working group budgets, voting in/out people in notable DAO positions etc).

To add, 2-4 hours per week per community director is not much (12 hours per month). I think the top layer of the DAO needs more active people, that are really in-touch with how the DAO is doing, and how working groups are getting along.

“Any Council member may step down from their position after providing a 30-day notice. The rest of the Council shall decide to run a special election for the open position(s), or leave the position(s) open until regularly scheduled elections.” Perhaps add a clause to say that if X council members leave in 1 term without being replaced, it is a requirement to run an election for replacement of any future quitters. To avoid council influence being concentrated amongst too few people. (edited)

Or instead of X people leave, say there must always be at least X council members. Since there is 30 days notice to step down, and it takes less than 30 days to re-elect, that should be maintainable.

If proposal stays as it is, community directors meeting once per week seems too infrequent in what will be a fast moving DAO. Every 2 weeks seems more appropriate to me.
If my suggestion is accepted, every 2 weeks for DAO directors instead.

Please feel free to respond to these ideas with critiques.

1 Like
3

The core idea behind this hierarchical structure is that the community sits above all else. The DAO Council reports the to the community. Given this, we felt it was important to put the Community Director at the top. This role would engage with community, keep their ears to the ground, and make sure the Council isn’t flying out of left field. (As well as providing oversight of Council operations and progress.)

12 hours per month times 3 people, with the idea being that the Community Directors would split portfolios to cover everything (if they chose). The Community Directors would not be providing direct oversight of the working groups (that would be the DAO Directors), instead they would be relying on the DAO directors for progress reports, as well as keeping the pulse of the communities interpretations of progress (or lack thereof). Additionally these hours could be adjusted later, should the need arise.

This is a good point, and I agree we should adjust the language. Perhaps something like “if one-third of the DAO Council resigns or is vacant at the same time, elections must be conducted, regardless of how soon regularly-scheduled elections would be conducted.”

The intent of this language is that there would be a monthly DAO all-hands meeting (similar to the Q&A that we recently did in discord). It doesn’t preclude the Directors from getting together more frequently.
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This is great commentary and feedback - thanks for taking the time to read and engage!

5

I received a question in Discord about the need for hierarchy, as well as being more innovative with respect to using existing web3 tools, etc. It may be a common question going forward, so I want to post my response here, too:
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We (the PDBG) chose this hierarchical structure because our experience and other “lessons learned” articles/twitter threads/etc indicated that a DAOs attempts at maintaining a flat structure were admirable, but ultimately there needed to be some kind of formalized hierarchy or structure. We considered this especially true for the Phonon DAO because once this gets more traction, we will need DAO reps dealing with hardware manufacturers, outside entities, etc.

I agree that automation and innovation are going to be key and encouraged, and the working groups will have all autonomy to implement these kinds of things, as long as they are within the framework of DAO goals, as defined by the community. This structure isn’t defined to force bureaucratic need for approval. Instead, it’s a way to help manage and guide the path forward, while letting the working groups drive implementation.

Perhaps the proposal isn’t totally clear. We (PDBG) have been crafting it in a step by step manner for a few weeks, so it seems clear to us, but we also know the intent behind the language. We (PDBG) can’t just assume it’s clear to everyone, so this kind of feedback is great!

…

Finally, I don’t intend to speak on behalf of the entire PDBG – these answers are my own. Though I did have a large role in crafting this proposal, I’m not defending it out of pride, but because I believe it’s a sound proposal. That said, I could be convinced to change my opinion of it by a good argument!

6

Thanks for your responses Andrew.

Point 1, I understand the reasoning behind it. And I agree that community should be critically important, but DAO Directors can take into account community from the community working group when making decisions. It just doesn’t seem logical to me that 3 people doing 12 hours per month are at the top of the DAO hierarchical chain.

In regards to the 3rd point,I agree. I think it’s important to ensure council cannot get too small. Enables high influence amongst too few people.

I figured this with point 4, but I still think the guideline should be a meeting every 2 weeks at a minimum. Although DAO is just getting started now, later this year there will be thousands of active participants in the DAO community. We need to be prepared for this scale, and compensation will be adjusted appropriately.

Overall, I understand your views, but stick to the view that collapsing Community Directors all together, expanding DAO directors by 1-2 more people (as an oversight of the DAO) and putting community into its own working group is more optimal.
Nevertheless, voters can see your proposal and my comments, if the vote concludes with ‘I like the idea, but would like to tweak it before approving’ we can discuss these changes + others in the comments. If it passes as it is, I look forward to working in line with the proposed structure.

Thanks.

1 Like
7

Cast my vote for “Leader” because it’s the most straightforward and doesn’t tread into corporate governance structures as deeply as Director.

8

Thanks Andrew for taking the lead on this, and for collaborating with me on this proposal.

This is an important step forward in the DAO’s lifecycle and will create a strong operational and strategic structure for the DAO moving forward.

Regarding the role of Community “Leader” (new name), as the person who suggested this oversight position, I feel it is very important that the Community Leaders have overall oversight and lack of any potential conflicts related to their decision-making.

The time commitment suggested for Community Leaders is only a guideline and I’m sure these individuals will be spending more rather than less time depending on what’s needed for the DAO.

There is a clear difference between the Community Leader and DAO Leader role. DAO leaders are expected to have operational visibility and a focus on driving forward the strategic plan. Community Leaders will be aware of the plan, endorse it, engage with the community around the strategic plan and operations and have review responsibilities. In some respects DAO Leaders will report in to Community Leaders, and due to this, these roles should be highly distinct given their different responsibilities. In addition, having clearly empowered community representatives on the DAO Council is vital to ensure that there is clarity around the community’s ultimate responsibility for the DAO, its mandate and strategy.

Given their role is more oversight than operations, I feel the time commitment for Community Leaders is justified, but as usual, they can spend additional time as-needed. As for the tempo of meetings, etc. I 'm sure that this will be determined once DAO operations under this structure begin in earnest.

9

After reviewing the responses from Andrew and DaVoice, I still feel I’m leaning toward the camp of OG! in that I’m not entirely sure what the Community Leader would be doing. I understand they are an oversight position and will be engaging with the community, but…isn’t everyone? I would think anyone actively working in these positions will be highly engaged in every aspect of their portion of the project and communicating most likely on a daily basis.

Would these people be ones preparing reports? Writing more formalized posts about the progress of projects? I appreciate the time spent putting this together, lots of work reflected here in this proposal and subsequent discussions.

1 Like
10

The point that everyone working on the DAO Council will be engaged and communicating on a daily basis is a fair one, but I would argue that we can be more streamlined for the sake of the DAO Leaders (DL) and Working Group Leads (WGL). Right now, it’s theoretically possible for everyone to stay up to date with the Discord, but will that always be the case? I would argue not.

When the Discord is bursting, I personally don’t want the DLs and WGLs trying to keep up. They need to be focused on the specific tasks they were elected to complete. It will be the Community Leaders (it seems like we’re gravitating towards “Leaders” :grin:) responsibility to distill the complaints and/or praise for the Working Groups and share that down the chain. The same goes the opposite direction with concrete progress made.

Conversely, if I’m a Phonon DAO Token holder, and I’ve got concerns about the project in general or a specific piece of the roadmap, I like that I can engage with a Community Leader that sits high on the hierarchy. To me, it shows that we understand the importance of the DAO at-large by creating a Community Leader that can really impact change.

1 Like
11

“Phon/ongod does not love [this proposal].” Please see this post for his arguments for creating a governance structure with less hierarchy: https://phonongod.substack.com/p/rogue-cohort?s=r

12

I actually wrote this up saturday, posted though deleted it; – simply because; last thing I’d want to do is " rock the boat." I have no desire whatsoever in complicating matters within the DAO.

Regardless, these are my views regarding the above structure hopefully they’ll have an impact upon those who read it and in some ways, help streamlining processes.

Last thing i’d wanna do is further hamper operations with additional bureaucratic nonsense; – my stance is quite the opposite : i will always vote in favor of forward momentum.

Though the structure which has been put forward seems to rely upon corporate-like systems duplication; instead of community innovation.

Status updates and progression of the DAO should be reflected by an automated system which updates itself and relies upon mathematics.

Each group should have a minimum number of goals per week.
While scope, objective, time and budget, crucial to each and every proposal put forward and clearly defined within such goals.

Following a chain of command each time an individual puts forth an initiative
instead of dividing tasks amongst members and what they chose to work on will further stagnate progress.

An overseeing council that meets once a month is an archaic, unproductive, segregated model. It informs the community instead of promoting engagement and involvement.

  • Strategic planning should be subdivided on a case by case manner while projects leaders should be elected whenever the project/task at hand is put forward(again, i can’t stress this enough the idea is movement; – how can project leaders coordinate their groups if they have no knowledge of the subject at hand.)

  • Time is of the essence (within whatever business) while, “Time Management Skills”, are acquired skillset which must be learned, reinforced and coordinated both by and amongst members throughout the entire project. (Yes this might be a drag though a requirement in order guarantee movement.)

  • Cut down timely decisions from 7 to 5 days (max)

  • Funding and internal projects should be structured with timely votes (3 days): scope, necessity, requirement, objective, quickly timed off-chain voting polls: discord bots or whatever automated infrastructure which is available (There are even tools to remind people: such as Ethereum Push Notifications, community dashboards, slack, telegram, rocket.chat, matrix or [pains me to say it] emails.) and a coordinated movement towards incentivizing groups.

  • Tools such as tally and coordinape are not only reward mechanism but community dashboards which promote rewards between members. They also provide an inside view thru research and analytics.

  • Votes can also be delegated and do not require that non-working members be a part of every decision.

  • Transparency, Cohesion and Productivity should be the aim here. A collective approach towards a common goal. (**a coordinated effort to push forward collectively. **).

I have no problem with someone being in “charge of a specific project” or “taking upon the responsibility to organize and coordinate working groups”. (i actually find it quite noble and admire those who will do so).

I do however find it rather odd that the above framework does not establish goals nor does it outline methods which could be used in order to promote their completion.

Generally speaking the root cause for unproductive communities is a byproduct of :

  • lacking member accountability
  • arbitrary execution of policies
  • non reinforcement of operational rules
  • Overlooking the current landscape and its ever-growing number of available tools (radicle, github, sybill, everst, commonwealth, collab.land, mintgate, kickback, sabllier, roll, disperse, boardroom, tally…)
  • Disregarding process methods such as : “The Double Diamond” or other product management approaches.
  • There’s also an inverse approach which we’ve completely ignored:
    a “bottom-up” approach. An inverse pattern.

If there’s one evident pattern which i’ve seen throughout these communities is, most operation fail due to a general lack of commitment.

I’d like to put forth a proposal for those who see both the potential within the technology and believe in this project as much as I do:

  • In order to secure individual and collective commitment I standby by a vesting of individual tokens (a “put your money where your mouth is” sorta-speak.)

Where:

  • Contributions are granted and work is reinforced throughout the structure; whenever members whom take upon a task “commit” a certain amount of tokens in order to guarantee that they’ll actually standby their commitment.

Members would be rewarded and compensated based on completion and quality. (A process I believe could be easily stream-lined thru the usage of off-chain voting polls, discord bots, discord polls and even tipping mechanisms [tools most of us are already acquainted with and which I’ve tested out and are running through my own separate server {merely for illustrative purpose and in order to verify the validity of my ideas.}])

I realize this is a novel approach to the entire system. That it might irritate a lot of people and cause internal turmoil. All i ask is that you keep an open mind while knowing that I’m not strictly attached to this; we can adapt. I’d love to hear out suggestions; – This could be optimized and actually become a model for other DAOs. This could be beyond novel technology; if executed correctly and if everyone chips in; it could serve as a model to streamline the entire governance process. I base my theory on the fact that :

I’ve never come across a group of members so talented, passionate and motivated, as those within this community. As such, i firmly believe that tweaking the idea together and exploring it further could be a “revolution within the revolution.”

These are my thoughts alone.

2 Likes
13

Maximum agility and reducing friction and bureaucracy are important. Possibly critical.

Structure and retention are also critical.

Running a project like this purely on gig-based compensation and participation is not the best practice. There’s a reason the best and brightest lawyers are put on retainer and kept available to organizations despite not having pre-identified tasks for everything they do.

Regardless of the wording the thing that really matters is getting the right people into the right roles – into the DAO. Each of us will have a different definition of “right people” but we should all have common threads in our definitions:

The right people will make the roles their own and do what needs to be done. They will move quickly. They will innovate and iterate. They will grow Phonon toward its potential.

If this structure is deterring the right people from applying for these roles, or from participating in Phonon DAO because of it, then it needs to be changed. If not, there’s no problem here.

2 Likes
14

I personally disagree that this proposal would do this.

This implies that the Council would only communicate once per month, which is not the case.

The point of this proposal is to create a governance structure that allows for the DAO to set its goals, as well as a mechanism to for accountability and oversight.

Although I disagree with some of the points here, I agree with everything else you mentioned in your post (the need for innovation, using new tools, being adaptable), and I believe that these things can still happen within the working groups.

Thanks for putting the time and effort into a response!

1 Like
15

Based on feedback from Rake and phonongod, I agree it’s less than ideal to force future DAO leaders into the working group boxes that made sense to us at the start of the PDBG.

Given that, I think we should tweak the proposal to get rid of our predefined working groups, and we should change the proposal such that Working Group Lead nominees are actually proposing the working group they want to create (could be anything), as well as a “why now” and their goals for their time leading said working group. We could then scale the number of DAO and Community leads (in a follow-on election, perhpas?) based on the number of elected WGLs.

Ultimately, I think it would be worth the effort to find or create a kind of rolling/open vote process that allows the community to vote on projects/goals for the DAO, but I think the lead time on that (as well as a more thorough analysis on whether it’s even a good idea) would be long enough that we shouldn’t wait to install some governance.

2 Likes
16

Queue the mic drop… favorite part was this:

“Though the structure which has been put forward seems to rely upon corporate-like systems duplication; instead of community innovation.”

I am much more in favor of this dynamic, bottom up approach. Using the Defi & Crypto Legos. Much better than 3 layers from execution. Not bad to have a structure and chain of command, but the red tape can be too extensive and cumbersome.

2 Likes
17

Posting this here (my response to this conversation from the Discord)

My feeling on this conversation is that a structure is required to get the DAO moving productively.

The current recommended process contains a nomination and voting period for each role: community leader, dao leaders and working groups, which I think is a good structure to follow.

There is also a process laid out to develop a formal operations and strategic roadmap for the DAO, alongside community representatives and people helping with DAO operations.

Regarding the working groups, it is a good idea to have structure there as well. If additional working groups that fall out side of the very (broad) categories mentioned in the proposal emerge, and there are people who are willing to step up to make those priorities happen, I’m all for it.

The issue I have with trying to cultivate a bottom up process at this point, is one that I’ve seen crop up in many open organizations: voter fatigue and community apathy.

We already see this with the current governance proposal, with 11 or so people voting/voicing their opinion on a key issue related to DAO governance.

Given this, and my experience across many DAOs where these issues are being tackled and grappled with having a structure that people coming into the DAO can understand where and how they can contribute is essentijal.

This also reduces issues related to community overload and apathy and focuses on getting some very important key issues sorted out rapidly.

Having dedicated people and teams who are responsible for managing these priorities is a must.

Having structure has helped already. The great work that Mickey is doing in the communications working group came out of the structure that was put in place around the PDBG. He has a mandate, is securing an operational budget and rallying people around him to continue work on this important process.

Creating structure and operational clarity is a must for open organizations and the – very flexible – framework proposed in the proposal I believe will help get this done efficiently and ensures the DAO is moving toward achieving its key goals in a rapid and efficient fashion.

18

Based on feedback from Rake and phonongod, I agree it’s less than ideal to force future DAO leaders into the working group boxes that made sense to us at the start of the PDBG.

Given that, I think we should tweak the proposal to get rid of our predefined working groups, and we should change the proposal such that Working Group Lead nominees are actually proposing the working group they want to create (could be anything), as well as a “ why now ” and their goals for their time leading said working group. We could then scale the number of DAO and Community leads (in a follow-on election, perhpas?) based on the number of elected WGLs.

In general I like the proposal. I voted to support it with tweaks.

Andrew makes a good point to create a more flexible system by having 0 working groups to start. Each time somebody wants to be the lead of group they can make a proposal to create a working group and make themselves the leader. This allows the DAO to increase the number of working groups as needed and doesn’t enshrine any working group as more important than another because it was initially deployed by this proposal.

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Would it be worth getting an objective “second pair of eyes” on the DAO structure?

Fire_Eyes has done some pretty incredible tokenomic work and with the new Wildfire DAO that James is spinning up, I’d be curious to get his thoughts on this. (may also be a good project for the Wildfire DAO and at the very least some great visibility for Phonon through that network)

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Sure. I’ll put up a bounty of 10000 phonon if they want to put some fair amount of time into it.