ok so the bonded funds can switched straight to “no-confidence” at no cost, or withdrawn with a penalty? maybe add a threshold where if you’ve lost a certain amount of bond a recall triggers automatically?
super upset I didn’t get this up weeks ago, these are valuable conversations that make the prop stronger IMO
I respect that. There are diminishing returns, tho, especially with respect to accountability to the DAO. I know you don’t like this “proposal vs. proposal” narrative, but I believe the current proposal offers enough space for innovation and action, in that DAO members are proposing their own working groups and plans.
the difference, tho, is that in your plan, buying more PHONON can get you direct access to the DAO’s treasury by way of consuls.
no, it gets you more votes in the election, and more say in the nominees.
Your request would be to establish a working group to implement your proposal/tackle the problem you see. This request would be sent to the DAO for voting. It is not approved by default. The burden is on the proposer to show that their working group is needed.
It seems as though I may not be fulling understanding this bonding proposal.
I think more scrutiny on people’s plans at this point would lead to fewer plans.
I just paid Risky another 1k for his next fight. I doubt I would have even thought to do any of this if not for the open field in front of me, and the idea that I wanted to do something cool.
I can afford to put down a couple grand to do that, but for those who can’t the DAO should let them rock. A little bit of oversight so people aren’t just grifting, but nothing like a “this is the comms budget” that makes people start thinking in scarcity terms.
if you want to be on the ballot, you post a bond. Maybe the ballot just gets sorted by bond size?
If you get elected the DAO holds your bond, releases it after you serve your term assuming no impropriety.
I get that. Under the proposal that the PDBG put forth, a Comms working group lead could add into their budget $X of extra money to account for these ad hoc advertising. I think its a good idea, and i would vote for that kind of proposal. Its up to the proposal to explain their thought process in asking for money to accomplish their goals.
Then during that term, the working group could spend the money w/o asking the DAO again. If the DAO took umbrage or thought malfeasance was happening, the checks and balances would step in.
this seems burdensome. Would the DAO accept my working group of “sponsoring Risky to fight giants”? Maybe. Would I want to go thru the process of justifying that to a bunch of people? Not even a bit.
And before you say “join an existing group and solicit the budget from them” let’s pretend I don’t like the existing group and do better working alone…
my aim here is to give individuals freedom to operate without oversight, and keep people in charge of funding them who have skin in the game and will use their discretion.
Yes a consul can just veto my proposal, but ideally they’d veto and talk to me about it and give a chance to convince them. It wouldn’t be an “oh our group doesn’t have time/budget for this” but a much more human thing as I imagine it.
In this instance where you disagreed with the current comms group and didnt want to join another, then yea, you’d have to go it alone by asking for your own money at the next (6 month) election cycle. These processes protect the dao treasury from ne’er-do-wells.
Ok, i get it. The theat here is that if you don’t comply with the will of those who bonded you (in my theoretical situation in my head, let’s say it’s a whale with bad intentions), then you’d be coerced to act for them, lest they take away your bond.
This puts the power in the hands of the consuls, and only the consuls.
This proposal is backed by whales, who can choose the consul to be one of themselves, and have tons of power. With little to no oversight.
How does that sound like a good idea to anyone?
Oversight is a good thing. It prevents anyone from gaining too much power, and keeps everyone involved and on the same page.
There has to be a balance between oversight and over-regulation, but this consul proposal has NO oversight and is completely unbalanced in that regard.
Operating without oversight at all is not a good idea.
‘Keep people in charge of funding them who have skin in the game’ is basically ‘keep whales in charge of funding.’
You said the quiet part out loud- you just want the whales to run the whole show. After all, he or she who holds the purse makes the rules.
I’m asking you to explain why the current proposal is not optimal. We’re not saying the current structure is perfect, but asking you to explain why it is flawed – without simply saying “i want someone in charge who does not have to operate with pesky oversight, consensus building and process.”
What I meant by the voting history is that DAOs tend to have lower and lower voting activity and attention. The processes are put in place not to slow stuff down or create a morass, but to actually ensure that the voice of the community is recognized and respected. People in DAOs don’t vote, and they don’t pay attention over time.
Giving power to someone who can do whatever they want unless 33% of the PHONON supply is put forth to veto them is simply devolving community oversight and accountability to two people who will have immense power and influence because they control the purse strings.
Oversight and accountability isn’t a bad thing. We’ve seen too many cases where stuff gets pushed through by a small cabal of people who control the Treasury, or a portion of it to engage in activities that benefit their friends, people who bribe them for access, etc.
The Consul idea does nothing to protect against these negative consequences of power concentration, and does everything to actually bring these negative forces to bear.
You don’t like process, paperwork or oversight and people should be able to do what they want. I get that.
I’m sorry, but with a Treasury that could go into the billions we need more oversight and accountability. Giving power to individuals who have the largest bags does not mean that they will make the best decisions. They may engage in short-term thinking and engage in activities that actually reduce the value of the network, rather than enhance it. We can’t hand over the purse-strings to people and say – because they were the best politicians and know how to gladhand PHONON holders (and god forbid, even bribe them for their bonds) that they’re the best person for the job. It’s likely that politicians won’t be the people who can take the DAO to the next level.
Also your proposal assumes that the richest know best, and that they will automatically have the best interests of the network in mind. This has been proven in Web3 to be untrue. Those with little financial power MUST be represented in any healthy organization and should have their voices heard. Many times those with the greatest financial risk seek one thing: maximum financial upside, the ecosystem, network does not matter if they get their profits in the short term.
I fundamentally disagree with the following assumptions embedded in this proposal:
Oversight is bad: Oversight promotes accountability and prevents fraud and abuse
Rich individuals know best: We all know this isn’t true
Those with the biggest bags should have the most sway. We’ve trying our best to develop processes in Web3 that diminish rather than enhance the power of rich individuals to hold sway over everything.
I engaged with your proposal and provided my questions. The fact that you can’t answer these basic questions about accountability, oversight, the need to prevent fraud and abuse and the tyranny of oligarchical systems tells me that this proposal needs fundamental work and much more thought.
Absolutely this! Thank you!
both proposals are backed by whales and the fact that it keeps getting brought up as an argument against this one in particular is SUS.
I agree. Possibly something for the time and effort to comp Rooster, not just a $1k reimbursement. To incentivize others as well.